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ABSTRACT
This study is an attempt to analyze the behavior of short selling due to
changes in main macroeconomic indicators of output, interest rate (in terms
of bond yields), and exchange rate, as well as the stock exchange index,
namely the Nikkei 225. In addition, this chapter examines the existence of
cointegration between short selling volume and the Nikkei 225 Index to inves-
tigate the permanent relation between the two. We have intentionally used
monthly Japanese data from November 2005 to October 2009 to encompass
the global financial crisis and differenced the series to attain stationarity. Our
Granger test of causality concluded a bidirectional relation between short
selling and the Nikkei 225. We could not verify causality between short selling
and gross domestic product, as well as the exchange rate, but there is causality
from the exchange rate to short selling.
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19.1 INTRODUCTION
Short selling has received a lot of attention in the last decade by academi-
cians, regulators, and investors. While some academicians argue that short
selling leads to higher market efficiency, others argue that short sellers are
investors with private information that aim to profit at the expense of naïve
investors. If the second view is correct, then we should also expect to
observe higher volatility in the markets due to short selling. Given the vary-
ing degrees of restrictions imposed on short selling in major markets starting
in 2008 due to the global crisis, we can assume that regulators prefer to
accept the second view over the first. For instance, in 2008, a wave of restric-
tions on short selling, some being temporary, was announced for more than
20 major markets.1 In particular, for Japan, short sales of all stocks were
prohibited until March 2009 and naked short selling was prohibited. More-
over, the threshold for disclosure obligation was set to 0.25% or more of
outstanding stocks.2
Is there a strong relationship between short selling and abnormal returns? In
other words, can short sellers predict a decline in share prices so that they
can profit by short selling? Some studies’ findings indicate that traders
cannot profit through short selling strategies. For instance, Figlewski and
Webb (1993) find no evidence between short selling and abnormal returns.
Similarly, Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990) and Woolridge and Dickinson
(1994) document no evidence between short selling and abnormal returns.
Using the TA100 index of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Cohen (2010)
suggests that short sellers cannot outperform the market and hence con-
tribute to market efficiency in the long run. However, Asquith and Meulbroek
(1996) focus on firms with large short positions to examine whether short
sellers are able to profit. Their finding shows a strong and consistent rela-
tionship between short positions and abnormal returns indicating the ability
of firms with large short positions to profit. This should not be surprising,
as firms with large short positions are expected to be more informed or
1 Introduction of new regulations for short selling in the United States by the SEC in 2005, short-term
ban of short selling in the United States in 2008, in the United Kingdom, and total ban in Australia
can be used to show how regulators view short selling.
2 For details, please see http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2008/20081027-2.html page from Financial
Services Agency of Japan.
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have access to private information. This finding is consistent with Boehmer,
Jones, and Zhang (2008) and Blau, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2010) as they
both find evidence that traders with larger short sales are more informed
than traders with smaller short sales. Blau and associates (2010) also docu-
ment that, with greater market efficiency, short sellers will have difficulty in
predicting future negative returns correctly using NASDAQ and NYSE short
selling data.3
For the Australian Stock Exchange, Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998)
provide evidence that short sales result in bad news for the market. Christophe,
Ferri, and Angel (2004) and Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) document
that the majority of short sellers are informed traders and are able to target
stocks with overvalued prices or potential downgrades. Moreover, Christophe
and colleagues (2004) find some evidence of a higher level of short selling for
firms with a negative earnings announcement. The Christophe and colleagues
(2010) study suggests a similar finding for analysts’ downgrade decisions. Both
findings imply that short sellers are informed traders.
Prior studies assume short sellers either as informed traders or uninformed
hedgers/speculators.4 For uninformed traders, there should not be a consis-
tent and significant relationship between short selling and abnormal returns.
If short sellers are informed traders, then they should be able to select over-
priced stocks or use the same set of information as stock analysts to come
up with the same downgrade decision. An alternative could be acquisition
of private information of a stock that is not publicly available. For example,
short sellers may receive tips from a brokerage firm for a potential down-
grade of a stock and then utilize this information to profit. The findings of
Christophe and colleagues (2010) show some evidence that short sellers
receive some private information, whereas Diether, Lee, and Werner (2007)
argue that the tipping hypothesis5 is highly unlikely to occur as there are
strict regulations levied on corporate insiders. This is true with approxi-
mately 75% of short sellers being institutional investors in the United States
(as implied by Boehmer & colleagues, 2008).
A third alternative is short sellers acting as voluntary market makers, as dis-
cussed by Diether and colleagues (2007) and Ko and Lim (2006). An exception
to this alternative is short sellers in Japan. Approximately 10% of short sellers
in Japan are exchange member firms, while the rest include customers such
as foreigner investors, corporations, and individual investors, which consist of
3 Specifically, they argue that NYSE is more efficient compared to NASDAQ and hence short selling is
more predictive picking out stocks with a potential decline on NASDAQ than NYSE.
4 Some informed traders will not participate actively in short selling due to legal or regulatory
constraints (Christophe & colleagues, 2010).
5 Prereleasing research to certain preferred investors before it is distributed widely.
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the majority. As a result, it can be argued that short sellers in Japan do not have
private information and have no obligation to provide market liquidity.6
However, Ko and Lim (2006) document that a positive relationship exists
between short interest and abnormal return; hence, even in the absence of
market makers short sellers’ actions provide liquidity to the markets.
In this study, we intend to analyze short selling in Japan using selected
macroeconomic indicators of output, interest rate, and exchange rate. As indi-
cated by Ko and Lim (2006), short sellers in Japan are mostly individual cus-
tomers with no private information and hence we expect them to pay close
attention to economic fundamentals as well as firm-related news. The sample
we use includes monthly data of short selling volume from the Tokyo Stock
Exchange and macroeconomic data including the Nikkei 225 Index for the
period from November 1, 2005, to September 30, 2009. Our period of study
is selected intentionally to encompass the global financial crisis.
After the introduction, the rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 19.2
reviews briefly the Japanese macroeconomic indicators. Section 19.3 is retained
to data and methodology, where we start with unit root tests of variables.
Given that we are working with time series data, we examine the stationarity of
all the series at the beginning of the period using the augmented Dickey–Fuller
test. We then investigate the existence and direction of causality, with the
so-called Granger causality test, and the cointegrating relation between short
selling volume and the Nikkei 225 Index.
19.2 DATA AND BRIEF OVERVIEW OF JAPANESE
MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
Monthly short selling figures come from the archives of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.7 The data set is monthly and covers November 1, 2005, through
September 30, 2009. All remaining macroeconomic data series are from
Nikkei (www.Nikkei.com).
Figure 19.1 plots the real gross domestic product (GDP) index. The plot
reveals that the Japanese economy was in recession during our sample
period. The last decade of the Japanese economy was associated with a low
growth rate, failure in attaining full employment, and persistent deflation.
Export-led growth, existing before 2007, came to a standstill in 2008. In
addition, the recession intensified as a consequence of the global financial
crisis with less expectation for constant growth in the coming years due to
an added uncertainty in forecasts. The continued quantitative easing of the
6 In that case, we should assume that the “tipping hypothesis” does not hold in Japan.
7 http://www.tse.or.jp/english.
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U.S. dollar by the Federal Reserve is expected to increase the price of the
Japanese yen in terms of the U.S. dollar. Hence, we should not expect
improvement in the export growth rate and export-led growth for the
Japanese economy. According to Figure 19.1, the real GDP index grew
gradually from the end of 2005 to early 2008, right before the crisis
impacted the Japanese economy, as evidenced by a decline in real GDP.
This decline continued until mid-2009 and decreased the real GDP index to
its lowest value since late 2005 or early 2006.
Although the Japanese economy grew slightly during the 2005–2008 period,
the unemployment rate appears to have hovered around 4% until early
2008. The Japanese economy is far from full employment levels, and the
unemployment rate has been reported greater than 5% in recent months.
Due to the stimulus package aimed at small businesses and local govern-
ments, more than $60 billion announced by the cabinet helped decrease the
unemployment rate below the 5% level. As shown in Figure 19.1, Japanese
trade had a slight positive trend until September 2008, and the decline
started right after that, largely due to the tightening of global demand to
Japanese commodities and services.
Figure 19.2 presents the behavior of the consumer price index (CPI),
exchange rate between Japanese yen and U.S. dollar, and 10-year govern-
ment bond yield rate between 2005 and 2009. The CPI stayed within a tight
band—between the levels of 99 and 103, except through a short period dur-
ing the credit crisis, where the upper bound was actually at an index level of
101. This stability of the Japanese CPI had a record of a −2.5% inflation
rate during the last 50 years. A negative inflation rate is undesirable for an
economy as it will deteriorate corporate profits and will place pressure on
wage rates. As documented by Figures 19.1 and 19.2, the Japanese economy
appears to be in recession with periods of deflation as a result of weak
demand. Finally, the Japanese yen starts appreciating against the U.S. dollar
since mid-2007 and against the euro since late 2008, putting more pressure
on Japanese exports. The large appreciation of the Japanese yen against the
euro during 2008 was mainly caused by depreciation of the euro against the
U.S. dollar. The quantitative easing programs by the Federal Reserve Bank
will likely not improve exchange rates in favor of Japanese exports. The plot
of the 10-year Japanese government bond yield rate implies that the real
interest rate is approximately zero percentage point per year, indicating slug-
gish growth in the Japanese economy. Consistent with the aforementioned
indicators, the interest rate does not change significantly during the exam-
ined period, and it was never reported more than 0.10% in 2010.
Figure 19.3 plots total volume of short selling volume and the Nikkei 225
Index. The movement of both variables over time appears similar, with the
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Nikkei 225 Index being smoother. The high correlation coefficient of 0.76
between these two variables supports the visual finding as well. Both series
display a decline in their levels at the start of the global financial crisis, con-
sistent with the macroeconomic series. The decline in short selling volume
after March 2008 is most likely influenced by the restrictions imposed on
short selling in Japan and in the rest of the world during 2008.
If short sellers are informed traders, which is more likely for Japan as most
short sellers are customers and not exchange member firms (Ko & Lim,
2006), they should follow macroeconomic series closely as well as firm-
specific information to predict a decline in share prices. For our analysis, we
consider the Nikkei 225 Index, the government bond yield rate, foreign








































































































































































Volume of short selling and the Nikkei 225 Index.
294 CHAPTER 19: Impact of Macroeconomic Indicators on Short Selling
19.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Monthly short selling values are obtained from the archives of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange8 from November 2005 to September 2009. All macroeco-
nomic data and stock index series are obtained from the Nikkei Web page
(www.Nikkei.com).
19.3.1 Granger Causality between Macroeconomic
Variables and Short Selling
We first check for the stationarity of the time series to avoid spurious regres-
sion. Dickey and Fuller (1979) designed a model to check for the existence
of a unit root and subsequently use an improved model called the “aug-
mented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test” (Dickey & Fuller, 1981).
We make use of the ADF test, which suggests the following model:
Δyt = α+ βt + λyt−1 + δ1Δyt−1 + δ2Δyt−2 +…+ δpΔyt−p + εt (19.1)
In this model, β is the coefficient of time to account for trend and p is the lag
order of the autoregressive process. The test checks whether λ = 0 or not, with
the help of critical values, listed specifically for this test. We use E-Views soft-
ware to execute the ADF test and report the results for both levels and first
differences of the series in Table 19.1. According to the test results, all series,
with the exception of “bond yields,” have unit roots and are not stationary at
levels, but the first differences of all series are stationary. Test results, as
shown in Table 19.1, show explicitly that the series under examination have
changing mean and/or autocorrelation over time. Although it is not necessary
to attain stationarity, we take the difference of the “bond yields,” as we
would like to have all variables in differences. Table 19.1 indicates that all
variables are stationary at their first differences.
Table 19.1 Unit Root Test Results at Levels, Ho Claims “No Unit Root”
Levels First Differences
Variable t Stat.a Prob. t Stat.a Prob.
Short selling −1.304 0.872 −8.645 0.0000
Nikkei 225 −2.27 0.441 −5.715 0.0001
GDP −1.971 0.602 −7.039 0.0000
Bond yield −3.702 0.032 −5.855 0.0001
Exchange rate
(yen/dollar)
−2.195 0.481 −6.088 0.0000
a1, 5, and 10% critical values are −4.176, −3.513, and −3.187, respectively.
8 http://www.tse.or.jp/english.
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One approach in examining the relationship between interacting variables is
to look at the causality among these variables. Granger (1969) designed a
statistical test, called the “Granger causality test,” using a series of t tests and
F tests to determine whether one time series is useful in predicting another
time series. The Granger causality test does not necessarily address
the cause-and-effect relation between variables as it may not indicate true
causality.9 We assume that xt and yt are two stationary series; to determine
whether xt Granger causes yt, first yt is autoregressed on itself and the proper
lag length is determined. In the next step the augmented autoregression of




βjxt−j + εt (19.2)
is estimated. The null hypothesis of “no Granger causality” is tested with
a version of the F test, which checks whether all coefficients of xt−j, namely βt−j,
are equal to 0. If all βt−j are found to be equal to 0, then xt−j does not precede yt−j.
Table 19.2 presents results for the causality test. To perform the test, we focus
on the short selling volume and the macroeconomic variables considered as
part of the short sellers’ information set.
The null hypothesis of “no Granger causality” is rejected highly significantly
for the relationship between the short selling volume and the Nikkei 225
Index with a p value of 0.242%. However, the causality test reveals causality
from the short selling volume and the Nikkei 225 Index with a lower signif-
icance level of 1.163%. Thus, test results document bidirectional causality of
Granger type between the Nikkei 225 Index and the short selling volume.
We find no indication of causality between short selling volume and GDP,
and the same is true for the bond yield return.
Table 19.2 Granger Causality Test Results of Variables with First
Differences
Null Hypothesis F Stat. Prob.
Nikkei does not Granger cause short selling 5.77264 0.00242
Short selling does not Granger cause Nikkei 4.21475 0.01163
GDP does not Granger cause short selling 0.77179 0.51720
Short selling does not Granger cause GDP 1.10629 0.35886
Bond yield does not Granger cause short selling 1.06901 0.37403
Short selling does not Granger cause bond yield 1.00406 0.40187
Exchange rate does not Granger cause short selling 2.77537 0.05484
Short selling does not Granger cause exchange rate 1.70138 0.18353
9 For example, if there is a third series that causes the first and second series to change, it is possible
to find a casuality between the first and second series.
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Although GDP is the most widely used indicator for the economic
performance of a country, it does not appear as a variable that leads to
short selling. Given the low levels of GDP growth rates in Japan and no big
surprises for expected changes in the past for the Japanese economy, this
should not be surprising. Finally, we find empirical evidence that documents
causality from exchange rates and short selling volume.
19.3.2 Cointegration between Short Selling Volume and
the Nikkei 225 Index
Following Table 19.3 results, we investigate the existence of a permanent
relationship between short selling volume and the Nikkei 225 Index in this
part of the study. Cointegration between variables is a convenient way to
propose the long-run relationship between them. If there is a list of series,
say Yt = ðY1t ,Y2t ,…,YntÞ, then this set of series is called “cointegrated” if
coefficients exist, β= ðβ1, β2,…, βnÞ, to satisfy β1Y1t + β2Y2t +…+ βnYnt
e
Ið0Þ,
where Ið0Þ denotes stationarity of the series. If cointegration is proven for a
series, then there is a long run equilibrium, and occasional deviations from
the streamline will be removed to restore the equilibrium.
We look for a cointegration relationship between short selling volume and
the Nikkei 225 Index with the assumption of a linear deterministic trend.
Cointegration test results are reported in Table 19.3. Findings indicate that
Table 19.3 Cointegration between Short Selling Volume and Nikkei
225 Index, Test Results
Trace Test
Hypothesized Trace 5% 1%
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical value Critical value
None 0.165754 8.807615 15.41 20.04
At most 1 0.010191 0.471180 3.76 6.65
Maximum Eigenvalue Test
Hypothesized Maximum Eigen 5% 1%
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical value Critical value
None 0.165754 8.336435 14.07 18.63
At most 1 0.010191 0.471180 3.76 6.65
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the null hypothesis of “at most 1 cointegration relation” is not rejected
according to the values of both trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics.
This implies that short selling volume and the Nikkei 225 Index have a per-
manent, long run relationship for the Japanese economy during the investi-
gation period. Table 19.3 displays normalized cointegration coefficients as
well as standard errors in the bottom rows.
19.4 CONCLUSION
We examined Japanese financial markets with monthly data from November
2005 to October 2009 to document if a causality relation exists between
short selling volume and macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, bond
yield, and exchange rate, as well as the Nikkei 225 Index. Given the charac-
teristics of Japanese short sellers, we expect a causal relationship between
macroeconomic variables and short selling volume, which indicates that
Japanese short sellers are informed traders. Based on this finding, we
can also assume indirectly that the tipping hypothesis does not apply to
Japanese short sellers. In addition, we also investigated the existence of coin-
tegration between short selling volume and the Nikkei 225 Index to deter-
mine whether a long run relationship exists between the two.
We found that the short selling volume, the Nikkei 225 Index, and the
exchange rate have unit roots and are thus nonstationary; however, the bond
yield rate is stationary. We achieved stationarity of the series at their first
differences. Using the Granger causality test, we also showed bidirectional
causality between short selling volume and the Nikkei 225 Index. However,
there is no causality between short selling volume and GDP, as well as bond
yield rate. However, our findings document that exchange rate Granger causes
a short selling volume, but short selling volume does not Granger cause
exchange rate. These findings indicate that the short sellers’ information set
contains the Nikkei 225 Index and exchange rate movements, but not macro
fundamentals. Our results also document the permanent long run relation-
ship between short selling volume and the Nikkei 225 Index.
We documented a cointegration relationship between short selling volume
and the Nikkei 225 Index. Further research in this direction may continue
with construction of an error correction mechanism to explore the duration
of the regression toward the mean over the long run in case of a shock to
the economy.
Money managers dealing with the Japanese market should concentrate on
the two findings of this study. First, short sellers are informed traders
and their information set does not include private information. Second,
the information set contains information mostly from stock and currency
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markets and does not seem to be influenced by economic fundamentals.
Hence, the prediction of stock price declines, instead of relying on tips,
using the aforementioned information set with firm level information, may
















2005-11 12,711 4.5 112.33 100.0 14368.1 118.41 139.54 1.445 8795
2005-12 12,825 4.4 117.66 100.0 15650.8 118.64 140.68 1.470 8830
2006-1 12,877 4.4 104.02 99.7 16085.5 115.45 139.99 1.560 9232
2006-2 12,865 4.1 107.89 99.5 16187.6 117.89 140.77 1.585 10,399
2006-3 13,006 4.1 126.89 99.9 16311.5 117.31 140.98 1.770 8902
2006-4 12,928 4.1 116.47 100.0 17233.0 117.11 143.56 1.920 8889
2006-5 12,984 4.1 110.51 100.2 16322.2 111.51 142.54 1.830 9611
2006-6 12,975 4.2 117.42 100.2 14990.3 114.53 145.14 1.920 10,386
2006-7 12,943 4.1 117.90 100.1 15147.6 115.67 146.72 1.915 9103
2006-8 12,958 4.1 120.89 100.3 15786.8 115.88 148.47 1.620 9244
2006-9 12,996 4.1 126.50 100.4 15934.1 117.01 149.11 1.670 8583
2006-10 13,017 4.1 125.82 100.4 16519.4 118.66 149.66 1.720 9722
2006-11 13,093 4.0 123.51 100.2 16101.1 117.35 151.13 1.645 9578
2006-12 13,072 4.0 128.09 100.1 16790.2 117.30 154.92 1.675 8716
2007-1 13,067 4.0 119.04 99.7 17286.3 120.58 156.56 1.695 9149
2007-2 13,149 4.0 118.71 99.4 17741.2 120.45 157.60 1.630 11,242
2007-3 13,053 4.0 134.23 99.6 17128.4 117.28 155.29 1.650 12,381
2007-4 13,187 3.8 123.64 99.9 17469.8 118.83 160.36 1.615 10,552
2007-5 13,211 3.8 127.40 100.1 17595.1 120.73 163.19 1.745 12,077
2007-6 13,185 3.7 133.26 100.1 18001.4 122.62 164.48 1.865 11,360
2007-7 13,175 3.6 134.44 100.0 17974.8 121.59 166.68 1.790 10,961
2007-8 13,273 3.7 133.26 100.2 16461.0 116.72 158.98 1.600 14,365
2007-9 13,357 4.0 129.02 100.3 16235.4 115.02 159.64 1.675 9298
2007-10 13,310 4.0 140.14 100.5 16903.4 115.74 164.74 1.600 11,399
2007-11 13,344 3.8 137.53 100.6 15543.8 111.21 163.28 1.460 11,920
2007-12 13,436 3.8 140.01 100.9 15545.1 112.34 163.50 1.500 9076
2008-1 13,452 3.9 129.23 100.5 13731.3 107.66 158.14 1.440 11,651
2008-2 13,264 4.0 130.12 100.4 13547.8 107.16 158.18 1.355 10,868
2008-3 13,300 3.8 142.67 100.8 12602.9 100.79 156.28 1.275 10,474
2008-4 13,303 3.9 133.20 100.8 13355.8 102.49 161.53 1.575 10,094
2008-5 13,325 4.0 132.73 101.6 13995.3 104.14 162.05 1.740 10,277
2008-6 13,447 4.0 142.00 102.0 14084.6 106.90 166.23 1.610 10,537

















2008-8 13,213 4.1 144.17 102.6 12989.4 109.28 163.75 1.405 9196
2008-9 13,132 4.0 146.32 102.6 12123.5 106.75 153.25 1.480 9270
2008-10 13,072 3.8 139.05 102.4 9117.0 100.33 133.49 1.480 9313
2008-11 13,080 4.0 108.75 101.6 8531.5 96.81 123.25 1.395 6432
2008-12 12,830 4.4 99.83 101.1 8463.6 91.28 122.79 1.165 5970
2009-1 12,855 4.2 79.24 100.5 8331.5 90.41 119.68 1.270 5706
2009-2 12,831 4.4 69.88 100.4 7694.8 92.50 118.33 1.270 6106
2009-3 12,816 4.8 83.73 100.7 7764.6 97.87 127.44 1.340 6597
2009-4 12,823 5.0 83.40 100.7 8768.0 99.00 130.50 1.430 6522
2009-5 12,846 5.1 77.59 100.5 9304.4 96.30 131.92 1.480 5714
2009-6 12,764 5.3 87.02 100.3 9810.3 96.52 135.46 1.350 7014
2009-7 12,805 5.6 93.20 100.1 9691.1 94.50 133.00 1.415 6590
2009-8 12,868 5.4 88.54 100.1 10430.4 94.84 135.31 1.305 5878
2009-9 12,912 5.3 97.01 100.2 10302.9 91.49 132.80 1.295 6429
2009-10 13,063 5.2 98.17 100.1 10066.2 90.29 133.87 1.405 5505
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